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Abstract. In this paper we propose a labelling based dialogue game for deter-
mining whether a single argument within a Dung argumentation framework is
skeptically preferred. Our game consists of two phases, and determines the mem-
bership of a single argument within the extension, assuming optimal play by di-
alogue participants. In the first phase, one player attempts to advance arguments
to construct an extension not containing the argument under consideration, while
the second phase verifies that the extension is indeed a preferred one. Correctness
within this basic game requires perfect play by both players, and we therefore
also introduce an overarching game to overcome this limitation.
1 Introduction
It has been argued that proof dialogues, while providing equivalent results to standard
argumentation semantics, can decrease the gap between intuitive and formal accounts
of argumentation [1, 11–13] , and have been used in human-computer interactions to aid
understanding [16, 6, 4]. While the credulous acceptance problem under preferred se-
mantics has been modelled using dialogue games in the past [16, 7, 12, 3], the skeptical
preferred semantics has received less attention.
In this paper, we propose a dialogue game for skeptical preferred acceptance that
is similar to [16, 10], but (i) differs from [16] in that it is not restricted to cases when
the preferred and stable semantics coincide; (ii) differs to approaches such as [12, 8] in
that it does not use a meta-dialogue based approach; and (iii) also differs from existing
approaches in that it uses argument labellings within the dialogue. Moreover, we believe
that this dialogue is more intuitive than [8, 10, 12, 16]. The principal aim of our dialogue
is to facilitate explanation as to why an argument is — or is not — skeptically preferred
to a human user (similar to the work of Caminada and Podlaszewski [5]).
Our dialogue utilises two phases. In the first, one participant (the opponent) identi-
fies an extension in which the argument under discussion is not present. In the second
phase, the other participant (the proponent) attempts to prove that the opponent has
(in some loose sense) cheated — that the extension advanced is not a preferred exten-
sion. Under perfect play, this dialogue will identify whether an argument is skeptically
preferred or not. In the presence of imperfect play, we extend this basic game to an
overarching one, which allows the two phases to repeat until both parties are satisfied
as to the presence or absence of the argument within all extensions.
Next, we introduce the argumentation system and labelling based semantics. Section
3 describes our dialogue. Note that a longer version of this paper containing proofs of
our results, extensions of the basic dialogue, and additional details has appeared as a
technical report [14].
2 Preliminaries
We begin with basic concepts from argumentation theory. Note that throughout this
paper, we consider only finite argumentation frameworks.
Definition 1 (Argumentation Framework [9]). An argumentation framework is a pair
AF = (Arg,Def ), where Arg is a finite set of arguments and Def is a defeat relation
between arguments: Def ⊆ Arg ×Arg.
Argumentation semantics focus on arguments that are justified in an argumentation
framework, whereas argument labellings (c.f., [15]) consider the status of all arguments.
In Caminada’s approach [2], an (partial) argument labelling is described as a function
L : Arg → {in, out, undec} such that in(L) = {a ∈ Arg s.t. L(a) = in}, out(L) =
{a ∈ Arg s.t. L(a) = out}, and undec(L) = {A ∈ Arg s.t. L(a) = undec}. Thus,
a labelling may be presented as a triple of the form (in(L), out(L), undec(L)). An
equivalence exists between those arguments labelled in according to specific labelling
procedures, and the various standard argumentation semantics. To define labelling pro-
cedures corresponding to the preferred extensions, we need to first recall the definition
of legal and complete labellings.
Definition 2 (Labellings [12],[2]). Let L be a labelling for AF = (Arg,Def ). An
argument belong to Arg is legally:
– in iff all its defeaters are labelled out;
– out iff there is at least one of its defeaters that is labelled in;
– undec iff not all of its defeaters are labelled out and there is none of its defeaters
that is in.
An argument is labelled illegally iff its label is not legal. We say that a labelling is
legal if all its arguments are labelled legally.
A complete labelling is a non-partial labelling without arguments that are illegally
in, out, or undec.
A complete labelling is called a preferred labelling iff its set of in-labelled argu-
ments is maximal (with respect to set inclusion); or equivalently, iff its set of out-labelled
arguments is maximal (with respect to set inclusion).
Note that an argument can only be labelled undecided if one or more of its defeater
are also undecided, and none of its defeaters are labelled in.
For a given argumentation framework, multiple preferred labellings may be found.
An argument is skeptically accepted under preferred labellings (and equivalently, se-
mantics) if it is labelled in within every preferred labelling. If an argument is labelled
in within a subset of labellings, then it is credulously accepted under the labelling.
3 A Dialogue Game for skeptical Preferred Semantics
We now describe a dialogical proof procedure for the skeptically preferred semantics.
Two players — P and O take part, with P seeking to prove that a single focal argument
f is skeptically preferred. Our dialogue has two phases, and we describe the legal moves
and protocosl for each phase.
Intuitively, within the first phase, O aims to find a preferred labelling where f is not
in. In the second phase, P verifies that this labelling is maximally in or out. The first
phase thus allowsO to identify a labelling where the focal argument is not justified, and
the second phase verifies that O did not cheat in Phase one.
Note that we need to consider only a subset of arguments in the framework, namely
those arguments which directly or indirectly defeat or defend the focal argument1. We
refer to the labelling of such arguments as a sub-labelling. Where the context is clear,
we may refer to a sub-labelling as a labelling.
Definition 3 (Dialogue Moves). The following moves are available to the dialogue
participants.
What is — WI (a). This move is used to request that a label be assigned to a, where
a ∈ Arg .
Claim — CL(L(a)). This move is used to assign a label L ∈ {in, out, undec} to a,
where a ∈ Args .
3.1 Phase One
In this phase,O seeks to create a complete sub-labelling of arguments in which the focal
argument f is undec or out. If O fails to construct such a labelling, it loses the game. If
on the other hand O succeeds, then the result of this phase is a complete sub-labelling,
which is evaluated by P in the second phase to determine whether it is a preferred
sub-labelling.
In this phase, P utters only WI moves, while O plays only CL moves. The pro-
ponent P initiates the dialogue with the move WI (f), where f is the focal argument
whose status is to be determined. Following this, O and P take turns to make an utter-
ance (with O making the second move). A CL(L(a)) move by O provides a labelling
for the directly precedingWI (a)move of P , whereL(a) is the label assigned to a. Note
that WI moves (and therefore CL moves) cannot be repeated. The Phase one protocol
is formally specified as follows.
Definition 4 (Phase One Dialogue). Let AF = (Arg,Def ) be an argumentation
framework. A phase one dialogue is a sequence ∆o = [δ1, δ2, · · · , δn] (n ≥ 1) satisfy-
ing the following conditions:
– odd moves (δi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i ∈ 2Z+ + 1) belong to P and even moves (δi, 2 ≤ i ≤
n, i ∈ 2Z+) belong to O.
1 i.e., only those arguments for which there is a directed path according to the defeat relation to
the focal argument in the graph generated by the argumentation framework.
– δ1 =WI (f), where f is the focal argument.
– each δi (2 ≤ i ≤ n, i ∈ 2Z+) is of the form CL(L(a)), where δi−1 =WI (a).
– each δi (3 ≤ i ≤ n, i ∈ 2Z+ + 1) is of form WI (a) s.t. ∃δj = CL(L(b))(j < i)
and (a, b) ∈ Def .
– there exist no two WI moves δi and δj (i 6= j) for which δi = δj .
Phase one terminates when no more moves are possible. O loses the game if it
1. utters CL(in(x)), where x is the focal argument in the dialogue; or
2. labels an argument in, having previously labelled one of its defeater in or undec;
or
3. labels an argument undec, having previously labelled one of its defeaters in; or
4. when no more moves are possible, there is an argument labelled undec for which
no defeaters are labelled undec; or
5. when no more moves are possible, there is an argument labelled out for which no
defeaters are labelled in.
If O does not lose the game when Phase one terminates, Phase two begins. Alterna-
tively, if O loses the game, then P wins. If O does not lose the game during Phase one,
then we must wait until Phase two terminates to determine whether O or P win the
game.
3.2 Phase Two
Here, P tries to prove that the labelling of Phase one is not preferred. If successful, P
wins the game and otherwise O wins. The latter occurs when O explores the conse-
quences of claims made by P .
This phase utilises the same moves as previously. However, now P utters CL moves
while O advances WI moves. As in Phase one, the proponent (P ) and opponent (O)
take turns to advance arguments. P makes the first move by putting forwardCL(in(x)),
where x was labelled undec in the Phase one. O responds to a CL move with a WI
move, and P responds to such a move with a CL move.
As in Phase one, the argument of a WI move must be one that defeats the argument
labelled by aCLmove, with the additional constraint that aCLmove may only be made
over arguments which were labelled undec in Phase one. The CL move then changes
the label of such an argument. Again, WI moves cannot be repeated. Formally, the
second phase of the dialogue is described as follows.
Definition 5 (Phase Two Dialogue). Let AF = (Arg,Def ) be an argumentation
framework and ∆o = [δ1, δ2, · · · , δn] (n ≥ 1) be a Phase one dialogue in which
O did not lose. A Phase two dialogue is a sequence of moves ∆t = [δ′1, δ
′
2, · · · , δ′m]
(m ≥ 0) satisfying the following conditions:
– odd moves (δ′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, i ∈ 2Z+ + 1) belong to P and even moves (δ′i, 2 ≤ i ≤
m, i ∈ 2Z+) belong to O.
– δ′1 = CL(in(a)) for a ∈ Arg such that ∃CL(undec(a)) ∈ ∆o
– For any 2 ≤ i ≤ m, i ∈ 2Z+, δ′i is a move by O of the form WI(a) where
a, b ∈ Arg and
• (a, b) ∈ Def
• CL(L(b)) ∈ ∆t; and
• CL(undec(a)) ∈ ∆o but CL(L(a)) /∈ ∆t; and
– each δ′i where 3 ≤ i ≤ m, i ∈ 2Z+ + 1, is a move by P of form CL(L(a)), where
δ′i−1 =WI (a).
– there exists no two WI moves δ′i and δ′j (i 6= j) while δ′i = δ′j .
The dialogue terminates when no further moves are possible. P wins the game iff it has
made at least one move during Phase 2 and the labelling at the end of Phase two is
legal. Otherwise, O is the winner.
The second phase requires P to demonstrate that the labelling advanced by O in
Phase one is not a preferred labelling. Since such labellings are maximally in, P does
so by changing the label of an argument labelled undec in Phase one to in. Once such
a change is made, Phase two continues by relabelling the undecided defeaters of the
changed argument until no further changes are required or possible. If P is able to
perform the relabelling in such a way so that the resultant labelling is legal, then it wins
the game as it has shown that the labelling advanced byO in Phase one is not maximally
in. If P fails in doing this, then O wins the game.
Note that the relabelling in Phase two does not require all undecided arguments to
be relabelled. Also, if no undecided arguments exist at the start of Phase two, the game
ends immediately, with O winning the game. Finally, note that while P was required to
relabel an undec argument to in, it would be equivalent to require undec arguments to
be labelled out.
Theorem 1. There is a winning strategy for P (under which they will win all games) iff
the focal argument is skeptically preferred. Similarly, there is a strategy for O (under
which O will win all games) iff the focal argument is not skeptically preferred.
This theorem requires perfect play by O and P is required for the dialogue to cor-
rectly identify skeptically preferred arguments. However, as we describe in [14], it is
possible to introduce a strategy, together with an extended form of the game, which
guarantees that the dialogue will be sound and complete even under imperfect play,
though at the cost of additional computational complexity (note that a single iteration
of the dialogue has complexity linear in the number of arguments). Unsurprisingly, O’s
strategy in Phase one involves advancing a preferred labelling, while in Phase two, P
should label the focal argument in and then proceed to label other undec arguments
appropriately. Since pursuing such a strategy may be computationally infeasible, the
extended form of the game (effectively) allows multiple games to take place, exploring
alternative labellings until both parties are satisfied as to the outcome of the game.
4 Conclusions
In this short paper we introduced a dialogue game for the skeptical preferred seman-
tics which exploits argument labellings. The basic game requires perfect play by both
opponents, but is useful in human-computer interaction settings where argument status
is explained by the computer to a human (c.f., [4]). As future work, we intend to in-
vestigate whether our approach can be more generally applied to any complete-based
skeptical semantics (e.g., skeptical stable).
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